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PARTIES
The sole plaintiff in the trial court and the appellant in
this appeal is Trillium USA, Inc. ("Trillium") . The sole defendant
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JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction of this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j)

(1996).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by extending

comity to the State of Florida and requiring that this lawsuit
against Broward County, a political subdivision of the State of
Florida, be pursued in Broward County, Florida, rather than Utah?
The decision to extend comity and dismiss a complaint against
a political subdivision of another state rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court.

Jackett v. Los Angeles Dept. of

Water and Power, 771 P.2d 1074, 1075, 1077 (Utah Ct. App. 1989);
Lee

v.

Miller

County.

800

F.2d

1372,

1376

(5th

Cir.

1986);

University of Iowa Press v. Urrea, 440 S.E.2d 203, 204-05 (Ga. Ct.
App.

19 93),

cert, denied

(1994);

Mianecki

v.

District Court, 658 P.2d 422, 425 (Nev. 1983),

Second

The trial court's

decision is therefore reviewed for abuse of discretion.
2.
county

Judicial

Id.

Does Utah!s venue statute applicable to suits against a
(Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-3) require that a suit against

Broward County be brought in Broward County, Florida?
This issue involves the interpretation and application of a
statute, which an appellate court reviews for correctness.
v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1240 (Utah 1998).

-1-

Jeffs

3.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in considering

arguments that were properly included in Broward Countyfs reply
memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss?
This issue is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Romrell v.

Zions First Nat f l Bank, N.A., 611 P.2d 392, 395 (Utah 1980); Boyd
v. Davis, 897 P.2d 1239, 1243 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
4.

Does Florida law govern the parties' dispute, either

because of a contractual choice of law provision or because the
applicable conflict of laws analysis requires the application of
Florida law?
Whether the terms of a written contract form a valid and
binding

choice of law provision

reviewed for correctness.

is a question

of

law and is

See Nova Casualty Co. v. Able Constr.,

Inc. , 1999 UT 69, SI 6, 983 P.2d 575.

Whether the law of a foreign

state is deemed to control under a conflict of laws analysis is
also a question of law that is reviewed for correctness.

See

American Nat ! l Fire Ins. v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 927 P.2d 186,
199 (Utah 1996).
5.

Regardless of whether the substantive law of Florida or

Utah applies to this lawsuit, did the trial court correctly dismiss
this lawsuit, either because Utah's venue statute requires that a
suit against Broward County be brought in Broward County, Florida,
or because comity mandates that this case be pursued in Broward
County, Florida?

-2-

The decision to extend comity and dismiss a complaint against
a political subdivision of another state rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court.

The trial court's decision is

therefore reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Jackett, 771 P.2d at

1075, 1077; Lee, 800 F.2d at 1376; University of Iowa Press, 440
S.E.2d at 204-05; Mianecki, 658 P„2d at 425,
The trial court's interpretation and application of Utah's
venue statute is reviewed for correctness.

See JeffsF 970 P.2d at

1240 (Utah 1998) .
DETERMINATIVE CASE AND STATUTE
A determinative--or strongly persuasive--case is Jackett v.
Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power, 771 P.2d 1074 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) (extending comity to the State of California and affirming
dismissal of a Utah complaint against political subdivision of that
state) .
A determinative statute is Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-3, which
states,

in relevant part, "An action against

commenced and tried in such county

a county may be

..."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This case is a breach of contract action brought by Trillium
against a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Broward
County.

-3-

B.

Course of Proceedings

Trillium

filed

April 30, 1999.

its

(R. 1.)

on June 17, 1999.

complaint

against

Broward

County

on

Broward County filed a Motion to Dismiss

(R. 11.)

In support of its Motion to Dismiss,

Broward County argued (1) that Florida law applies to this action
under a choice of law provision in the contract and under a choice
of law analysis; and (2) that under Florida law, this case must be
pursued in Broward County, Florida, not Utah.

(R. 14-23.)

In response to Broward County's Motion to Dismiss, Trillium
argued

(1) that Utah

substantive

law applies

to this action;

(2) that even if Florida substantive law applies to this action
Utah procedural law applies; and

(3) that since Utah procedural

law, not Florida procedural law, applies, Broward County could be
sued in Utah.

(R. 148-60.)

In its reply memorandum, Broward

County addressed the arguments in Trillium1s response memorandum by
showing that even if the court were to look to Utah law
Trillium

claimed

dismissed.

applies

to

this

case),

this

case

(which

should

be

First, a Utah venue statute requires a suit against a

county to be commenced in that county.

Second, under the principle

of comity, which is part of Utah law, actions against Broward
County must be pursued in Broward County, not Utah.

(R. 165-74.)

After Broward County filed its reply memorandum,

Trillium

submitted to the trial court a ten-page supplemental "surreply"
memorandum that also opposed Broward Countyfs Motion to Dismiss.
(R. 240-50.)

Although a surreply memorandum is not authorized by
-4-

applicable rules, Broward County chose not to object to Trillium1s
surreply memorandum, choosing instead to focus the trial court's
attention on the main issue—whether a political subdivision of the
State

of

Florida

was

properly

defendant in, a Utah court.

sued

in,

and

should

remain

a

(See R. 253.)

In an apparent attempt to divert the trial court's attention
from the heart of the issues involved in Broward County's Motion to
Dismiss, Trillium also moved

to strike Broward

memorandum in support of its motion.

(R. 229-31.)

opposed that motion to strike, pointing out
memorandum

properly

addressed

Trillium's response memorandum;
judicial

resources

to grant

arguments

County's

reply

Broward County

(1) that its reply

that

were

made

in

(2) that it would be a waste of

the motion

to strike

and

require

Broward County to file a separate motion on the comity issue; and
(3) that Trillium had a full and fair opportunity to brief all
issues that were presented to the trial court, including the comity
issue.

(R. 251-53.)

The trial court held oral argument on February 25, 2000.
283.)

(R.

Trillium did not attempt to raise and did not even mention

its motion to strike at the hearing.

(See R. 302 at pp. 2-26.)

Both parties were accorded a full and fair opportunity to raise and
argue all issues pertaining to Broward County's Motion to Dismiss.
(See id.)

-5-

C

Disposition in the Court Belov?

The trial court granted Broward County's Motion to Dismiss.
(R. 283-85.)
2000.

The final Order of Dismissal was entered on March 8,

(R. 284-85.)

The trial court made no ruling on Trillium's

motion to strike.
D.

Statement of Facts

1.

Broward County is a political subdivision of the State of

Florida located in Broward County, Florida.
2.

Trillium

claims

that

contract with Trillium in 1995.
3.

Broward

(R. 2, 15.)

County

entered

(R. 162.)

The contract upon which the Complaint was based was

negotiated and entered into in Broward County, Florida.
4-

(R. 72.

See also R. 162.)

Trillium claims the goods were actually delivered to

Florida, where they are currently located.
7.

(R. 71-72.)

The contract required Trillium to deliver and install

goods in Broward County, Florida.
6.

(R. 71.)

All bids for the contract were issued from and received

and accepted in Broward County, Florida.
5.

into a

(R. 3, 302 at p. 12.)

The contract upon which the Complaint was based states,

in relevant part:
Applicable provisions of all Federal, State,
County and local laws, and of all ordinance,
rules
and
regulations
including
the
Procurement of Broward County shall govern
development, submittal and evaluation of bids
received in response hereto and shall govern
any and ail claims and disputes which may
arise between person (s) submitting a bid in
response hereto and Broward County by and
-6-

through its officers, employees and authorized
representatives, or any other person natural
or otherwise. Lack of knowledge by any bidder
shall not constitute a recognizable defense
against the legal effect thereof.
(R. 71, 77.)
8.

Trillium claims Broward County breached the contract.

(R. 2-4.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by extending

comity to the State of Florida and requiring that this lawsuit be
pursued,

if

at

all,

in

Broward

County,

Florida.

Utah

law

recognizes the principle of comity, by which the laws of another
state (rather than Utah) may be applied and by which immunity from
suit in this state may be extended to political subdivisions of
other states.

The trial court correctly applied the reasoning and

relevant factors enumerated in Jackett v. Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power, 771 P.2d 1074 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), as well as in
numerous other cases that have extended comity to sister states and
their political subdivisions.
2.

Utah's venue statute applicable to counties requires that

this suit against Broward County be brought in Broward County.
Rather than apply the plain language of the statute, Trillium
attempts to rewrite the statute or add language that does not
exist.

Courts are required

to apply the plain language of a

statute.

-7-

3.

The trial court properly considered arguments that were

included in Broward County's reply memorandum in support of its
motion to dismiss. As is permitted, the reply memorandum addressed
issues

that

were

raised

in

Trillium1s

response

memorandum.

Furthermore, Trillium filed a ten-page "surreply" memorandum that
fully responded to all arguments made in Broward County's reply
memorandum.

Trillium was also given a full and fair opportunity to

argue all issues during oral argument.
ruling

would

cause

a

senseless

Reversing the trial court's

waste

of

judicial

resources,

especially since Trillium has fully presented its arguments on all
issues both to the trial court and to this Court.
4.

Florida substantive law governs the parties' dispute in

this case; it is therefore more appropriate for a Florida court to
resolve this case.

The parties' contract contains a valid and

enforceable choice of Florida law provision.

Furthermore, a common

law choice of law analysis shows that Florida law applies.

In

particular, a breach of contract action involving the sale of goods
or provision of services is governed by the law of the state in
which the goods are delivered or services provided.
(Second) Conflict of Laws §§ 191, 196 (1971).
state is Florida.

Restatement

In this case, that

Also, an analysis of the "most significant

relationship" test points to Florida law.
5.

Regardless of whether the substantive law of Florida or

Utah applies to this lawsuit,

the trial court correctly dismissed

this lawsuit, either because Utah's venue statute requires that a
-8-

suit against Broward County be brought in Broward County, Florida,
or because comity mandates that this case be brought in Broward
County, Florida.

This case was properly dismissed even if Utah

procedural law applies, since Utah's venue statute requires that a
suit against Broward County be pursued in Broward County.

More

important,

both

the

substantive

principle

and

of

procedural

comity,

law,

which

requires

applies

that

this

to

case

be

litigated in Florida courts.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THIS CASE BASED ON THE
EXTENSION OF COMITY TO THE STATE OF FLORIDA.
The trial court dismissed this case for all the reasons argued

by Broward County.

(R. 284-85) .

More specifically, the trial

court extended comity to the State of Florida and ruled that venue
in this case properly lies in Broward County, Florida, not Salt
Lake County, Utah.

(See id. ) That ruling was proper and should be

affirmed.
Standard of Review
Trillium attempts to apply the wrong standard of review to the
issue of whether the trial court properly ruled that, as a matter
of comity, suit should be brought in Florida.

Without citation to

any authority directly on point, Trillium asserts that this issue
raises a question of law.

(Appellant's Brief p. 4.) 1

'Trillium cites Tiede v. State. 915 P.2d 500 (Utah 1996) for
the notion that a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion
to dismiss is a question of law. Tiede did not involve any issue
-9-

Trillium ignores a Utah case directly on point.

In Jackett v.

Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, 771 P.2d 1074 (Utah Ct.
App»

1989), the court held, "The decision to apply comity in a

particular

case

is

fact

sensitive.

Therefore,

courts

have

consistently found that the decision to apply comity rests within
the sound discretion of the trial court."

id. at 1075 (citations

omitted).
In Jackett, the trial court, as a matter comity, granted a
motion to dismiss a complaint in a Utah case after applying a
California

statute

of limitations.

id.

The

appellate

court

affirmed the dismissal, applying an abuse of discretion standard of
review.

id. at 1077.

See also, e.g., Lee v. Miller Countyr 800

F.2d 1372, 1376 (5th Cir. 1986)

("the

decision to extend comity

rests in the sound discretion of the trial court"); University of
Iowa Press v. Urrea, 440 S.E..2d 203, 204-05 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993),
remotely touching upon a trial court's application of the principle
of comity. The issue in Tiede was whether the State of Utah was
immune from a wrongful death claim based on negligence—a pure
legal question.
See id. at 501-04.
The question of whether a
trial court properly granted a motion to dismiss based on the
principle of comity is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See cases
cited in text.
Trillium's reliance on Pan Energy v. Martin, 813 P.2d 1142
(Utah 1991), is also misplaced.
In Pan Energy, a specific Utah
statute required that foreign judgments that have been recorded in
Utah must be treated "in all respects" as a judgment of the
district court of Utah. See id. at 1143. That statute expressly
precluded treating a foreign judgment differently than a local
judgment, id. at 1146. There is no statute in Utah that expressly
precludes application of Florida's venue laws in this case. If
anything, Utah statutes expressly require that suit against Broward
County be brought only in Broward County, Florida. Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-13-3.
-10-

cert, denied, (1994)

(trial court's decision on whether to extend

comity

abuse

reviewed

for

of discretion);

Mianecki

v.

Second

Judicial District Court, 658 P.2d 422, 425 (Nev. 1983) (case cited
by Trillium; holding whether to apply principle of comity is within
discretion of trial court).

Accordingly, an abuse of discretion

standard of review applies to this case.
B

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It
Dismissed this Case on Grounds of Comity.

The overriding issue in this appeal is whether the trial court
abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint on the ground of
comity, ruling that judicial proceedings against Broward County, if
any, be brought in Broward County.
its discretion in so ruling.

The trial court did not abuse

The trial court's ruling is correct

even if a "correction of error" standard of review were applicable.
As a matter of law and as a matter of discretion, the trial court
properly gave effect to the law of Florida

(or the law of Utah,

which is consistent) that lawsuits against a county must be brought
only

in that county where the defendant is headquartered.
Numerous courts in many jurisdictions, including Utah, have

refused

to

exercise

jurisdiction

over

a

foreign

state

or

a

political subdivision of another state based on the principle of
comity—respect for the foreign state and its laws.
supra

E.g. Jackettr

(dismissing suit against California governmental entity).

Indeed,

the

subdivisions

"general

rule"

must

brought

be

is

that
in

-11-

the

suits

against

jurisdiction

political
where

the

political entity is situated.

See Liquid Carbonic Corp. v. City of

New York, 374 A.2d 1258 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977), cert.
denied, 384 A.2d 502

(N.J- 1977)

(recognizing general rule and

dismissing suit against City of New York based on principle of
comity).

See also numerous cases mentioned below.

The principle of comity has been aptly described as follows:
Comity is a principle under which the courts
of one state give effect to the laws of
another state or extend immunity to a sister
sovereign not as a rule of law, but rather out
of deference or respect. . . . Courts extend
immunity as a matter of comity to foster
cooperation,
promote
harmony,
and
build
goodwill.
Hawsey v. Louisiana Dept. of Social Servs., 934 S.W.2d 723, 726
(Texas'Ct. App. 1996) (affirming dismissal of suit against agency
of foreign state).

Utah law recognizes the principle of comity and

will apply it in appropriate circumstances—such as this one—to
require that a sister state or its political subdivision be sued in
its home state.

See Jackett, supra.

There is no dispute about the fact that under Florida law a
county can only be sued in its home county.

See Carlile v. Game

and Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 354 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1978); Lake County
v. Friedel, 387 So.2d 514

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980);

Florida

Public Serv. Comm'n v. Triple "A" Enterprises, Inc., 387 So.2d 940
(Fla. 1980);

Volusia County v. Atlantic Int'l Investment Corp.,

394 So.2d 477 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
Utah law is consistent.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-3 states, "An

action against a county may be commenced and tried in such county
-12-

. . ."

The word "may," as used in a venue statute such as this

one, has been uniformly interpreted to mean "must" or "shall."
Moseley v. Sunshine Biscuits, 107 F. Supp. 164, 165

(W.D. Mo.

1952); Willis Shaw Frozen Express v. Diabv, 538 S.W.2d 706, 707
(Ark. 1976) .

Thus, under both Utah and Florida law, a lawsuit

against a county must be brought in the defendant's home county.
In this case, the trial court properly relied on the principle
of comity to require that suit against Broward County be brought in
Broward County.

The Jackett case is directly on point.

The

plaintiff in that case filed suit in Utah against a political
subdivision of the State of California.
helicopter crash that occurred in Utah.
the action and the plaintiff appealed.

The suit arose from a

The trial court dismissed
The single issue on appeal

was "whether the trial court erred in applying, as a matter of
comity,

the

California's

two-year

statute

Governmental

cause of action in Utah."

of

limitations

provided

Claims Act, thus barring
771 P.2d at 1075.

in

plaintiff's

The Utah Court of

Appeals held that comity was properly extended to the State of
California and that the case was properly dismissed,

id. at 1075-

77.
The Jackett court noted that under a normal conflict of laws
analysis, the applicable Utah statute of limitations would apply.
Applying the doctrine of comity, however, the court affirmed the
trial

court's

application

of California's

two-year

statute of

limitations, which required dismissal of the claim against the
-13-

California governmental entity.

Relying on advice from the U.S.

Supreme Court, the Utah Court of Appeals stated, "It may be wise
policy, as a matter of harmonious interstate relations, for states
to accord each other immunity or to respect any established limits
on liability.

They are free to do so."

Id. at 1076

Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426 (1979)).

(quoting

The court articulated

four reasons to extend comity in favor of political subdivisions of
other states:
[1] to give primary regard to the rights of
their own [the foreign state's] citizens;
[2] to foster cooperation, promote harmony and
build goodwill with sister states; [3] to have
claims against the state litigated by that
state's own courts; and [4] to prevent forum
shopping and avoid practical problems involved
in enforcing a judgment by one state against
another.
771 P.2d at 1076 (footnotes containing citations omitted).
Application of the four Jackett
dismissal of this case.

1.

factors requires

All of the reasons for extending comity that were articulated
in Jackett

support

the trial

court's

dismissal

of this case.

First, applying the law of Florida regarding venue in suits against
counties

gives

primary

regard

to

the

rights

of

citizens

of

Florida—and specifically citizens of Broward County—by assuring
that county representatives will not be forced to divert their
attention from county business by defending actions in various
forums in many different states.

See K.D.F. v. Rex, 878 S.W.2d

589, 595 (Tex. 1994) (Kansas venue statute requiring suits against
Kansas political

subdivision

to be pursued
-14-

in Kansas

advances

policy

of minimizing

litigation

costs

taxpayers

must

bear by

providing state agencies with convenient venue in which to litigate
disputes) .
Applying Florida law in this case will promote the Florida
public policy of allowing county officials to defend lawsuits in
their home county.

This policy is consistent with Utah public

policy, which also requires suits against a county to be brought in
that county.
1077

Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-3.

(fact that Utah

and

foreign

See Jackett, 771 P.2d at

state have

similar

immunity

statutes favors application of foreign statefs immunity law in suit
against foreign state brought in Utah).
Second, extending comity to the State of Florida will "foster
cooperation, promote harmony, and build goodwill" with Florida and
other

states.

counties
Utah

Jackett, 771 P.2d

at 1076.

For example, Utah

can and should expect the State of Florida to respect

laws governing

suits

against

include applicable venue provisions.

Utah

counties.

That

would

Thus, if Salt Lake County

were to be sued in Broward County, Salt Lake County could and
should expect the Florida court to honor Utah's venue provisions.
Utah political entities cannot expect courts of other states to
respect Utah's venue provisions or any other important Utah law or
policy unless Utah courts are willing to extend the same sort of
comity to its sister states.
95

See, e.g. , K.D.F., 878 S.W.2d at 594-

("Texas should not extend comity to another state so long as

that state declines to extend comity to Texas or other states under
-15-

the same or similar circumstances"); Baldwin Enterprises, Inc. v.
Town of Warwick, 545 A.2d 201, 203

(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.

1988), cert denied, 550 A.2d 471 (N.J. 1988) ("We would want and
expect courts of such neighboring states to respect our important
governmental . . . policy by declining jurisdiction in the exercise
of comity.

Our courts should do no less."); Ramsden v. State of

Illinois, 695 S.W.2d 457, 460 (Mo. 1985) (dismissing suit against
State of Illinois and noting Missouri would certainly prefer to
have claims against it litigated in its own courts).
Hawsey provides an excellent case in point.

In that case, the

court extended comity to the State of Louisiana and refused to
exercise jurisdiction over a subdivision of that state.

Central to

the court's decision was the fact that decisions from courts of the
State of Louisiana had extended similar comity to other states.
934 S.W.2d at 726-27.

Had Louisiana been perceived by the Texas

court as uncooperative, the Texas court almost certainly would not
have extended comity to Louisiana.
Florida

courts,

it

should

extending comity to other states.

See id.
be

noted,

are

cooperative

in

See Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft

Corp., 201 So.2d 743, 751-52 (Fla. 1967) (holding Florida court in
action for death of Florida citizen in airline accident in Illinois
would extend comity and apply Illinois statutory limitations on
damages).

The same respect and cooperation should be extended to

Florida.

-16-

Other courts have refused to exercise jurisdiction over a
sister

state or its political

primarily—out

subdivision

solely—or

at least

of respect for that state's sovereignty.

E.a.r

Paulus v. State of South Dakota, 201 N.W. 867 (N.D. 1924); Ramsden,
695 S.W.2d at 460 ("Missouri is free to close its courts to suits
against a sister state as a matter of comity").

In this case,

there is much more than just respect for Florida's sovereignty to
support dismissal.

There is also a specific venue provision in

both Florida and Utah law that requires all suits against Broward
County to be brought in Broward County.
In short, affirming dismissal of Broward County in this case
will

promote

cooperation,

Florida and other states.

harmony

and

goodwill

between

Utah,

Allowing Broward County to be sued here

would promote just the opposite.
Third, extending comity to the State of Florida in this case
would obviously promote the interest of having "claims against a
state litigated by that state's own courts."
1076.

The

only

possible

way

to

have

Jackett, 771 P.2d at

this

claim

against

a

subdivision of the State of Florida litigated by Floridafs own
courts is to affirm the dismissal and require Trillium to pursue
this case where it belongs — in Broward County.
Fourth, extending comity in this case and requiring this suit
to be

brought

involved

in

in

Florida

enforcing

Broward County.

any

would

avoid

the

judgment—however

practical

problems

unlikely—against

For example, even if Trillium somehow were able to
-17-

obtain

a

judgment

against

Broward

County

from

a Utah

court,

Trillium would still have to go to Florida and seek the assistance
of Florida courts to enforce the judgment.

Since Trillium would

eventually be forced to resort to Florida courts to enforce any
judgment, it is far more practical and resourceful to require
Trillium to initiate this suit there, as required by the laws of
both Florida and Utah.
The Jackett court also referred to the importance of whether
the public policies of the forum state would be contravened if
comity were extended.
203

Id. at 1076.

See also Baldwin, 545 A.2d at

("Special deference should be given to the policy of the non-

forum state when that state's strong governmental policies are
implicated.").
would

Trillium argues that extending comity in this case

contravene

statute.

a public

policy

embodied

in Utah!s

long-arm

In effect, Trillium attempts to make this case a minimum

contacts/personal

jurisdiction case.

It is no such case.

By

filing its motion to dismiss and not raising a defense of personal
jurisdiction, Broward County has conceded that personal jurisdiction exists in this case.
trial court was required

That does not mean, however, that the

to exercise personal jurisdiction.

See

Baldwin, 545 A.2d at 202 (holding that issue of whether to extend
comity did not involve question of personal jurisdiction, "but
whether New Jersey should defer to New York, after weighing the
importance of the issue under policies of each state, and decline
jurisdiction on principles of comity"); Hawsey, 943 S.W.2d at 726
-18-

("Identification of minimum contacts, however, does not determine
whether

Texas

should

decline

jurisdiction

in

the

interest

of

comity-"); K.D.F., 878 S.W.2d at 595-96 ("Identification of minimum
jurisdictional

contacts

under

the

long-arm

statute

does

not

determine whether Texas should decline jurisdiction in the interest
of comity."); Liquid Carbonic, 374 A.2d at 1259 (long-arm rule has
no application to question of jurisdiction over a subdivision of
another state); University of Iowa Press, 440 S.E.2d at 204 (comity
extended and suit against subdivision of sister state dismissed
notwithstanding existence of minimum contacts).
Furthermore, requiring Trillium to pursue this case in Broward
County is not contrary to the supposed "public policy" on which
Trillium

relies.

Trillium

dismissal of this lawsuit.

is not

denied

a remedy

simply by

Trillium is free to pursue this case in

Florida if it chooses to do so.

Florida has a reliable civil

justice system just like any other state.

In fact, if Trillium

were somehow able to pursue this case to a final judgment, it would
be

forced

judgment.

to resort

to the courts of

Florida

to enforce

its

Trillium has not made and cannot make any showing that

it will be denied its day in court in Florida.

See, e.g., Simmons

v. State of Montana, 670 P.2d 1372, 1385 (Mont. 1983) (extending
comity to State of Oregon and noting plaintiff still had remedy in
Oregon courts); Paulus, 201 N.W. at 869 (extending comity to State
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of South Dakota and noting availability of remedy in South Dakota
courts).2
As noted above, Trillium also completely ignores the Jackett
case when Trillium argues that the "Utah legislature [by means of
the long-arm statute] has removed from the Utah courts discretion
to grant immunity to a foreign state or its subdivision under
principles of comity."

(Appellants Brief p. 31.)

exactly what the Jackett court did.

In fact, that is

The Jackett court held that

comity would be extended to California, and that the two-year
statute

of

limitations

contained

Claims Act would be applied.

in

California's

Governmental

On that basis, and using an abuse of

discretion standard, the Jackett court affirmed dismissal of the
complaint and held that a political subdivision of the State of
California was immune from suit in Utah.

771 P.2d at 1075-77.

Of

note, this left the plaintiff in Jackett with no remedy, since he
could not bring suit in California.

Id. at 1075.

In contrast, the

trial court1 s dismissal in this case does not deny Trillium a

2

Even if there were a conflict between the public policies of
the State of Florida and the State of Utah, the policies of the
State of Utah should not automatically prevail. Utah should defer
to the interests of the State of Florida because Floridafs
interests in having this suit litigated in Florida involve
governmental functions. See Baldwin, 545 A.2d at 204 (noting court
might choose to defer to important governmental interests of sister
state where forum state's interests are relatively less important).
Accord Lee, 800 F.2d at 1375; Robertson v. Estate of McKnight, 609
S.W.2d 534, 536 (Tex. 1980).
Because Trillium has a complete
remedy by suing in Florida, the public policy of Utah on which
Trillium relies is insubstantial in comparison to the interests of
Florida that require suits against Florida to be pursued in
Florida.
-20-

remedy.

The dismissal is "without prejudice" to the refiling of

this case in Broward County, Florida.
The
extension

public

policy

of

Utah

(R. 285.)

actually

of comity in this case.

strongly

favors

the

Utah venue provisions

are

consistent with Florida venue provisions in that they require suits
against a county to be filed in the home county.
§ 78-13-3.
allowing

Utah Code Ann.

This venue statute promotes the obvious policy of

government

officials

and employees

to focus on their

public duties without being forced to travel to other states to
defend any number of lawsuits that could be brought. See, e.g.,
K.D.F., 878 S.W.2d at 595.
Trillium

also

attempts

to pooh-pooh

the

Jackett

case by

pointing out that the plaintiff was not a Utah citizen and that the
case may have involved forum shopping.

While these factors may

have impacted the court's thinking, neither factor was controlling
to its decision.

The trial court in this case was entitled to

consider all relevant factors and make a judgment as to whether
comity should or should not be extended.

As demonstrated above,

each of those factors overwhelmingly supports dismissal of this
case.

Furthermore, Trillium1s counsel essentially admitted to the

trial court that its decision to file this case in Utah was in fact
a matter of forum shopping on Trillium's part.

(R. 302 at pp. 9-

10: "It is unfair to expect my client that if they breach the
contract they have to go all the way down to Florida . . . and be
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hometowned down there.") Comity should be extended in this case to
prevent forum shopping.
2.

Jackett, 771 P.2d at 1077.

The reasoning of numerous other cases also supports
extension of comity and dismissal of this case.

In addition to the reasons stated by the Jackett court, there
are several other reasons, supported by numerous cases, that the
trial court's dismissal of this case should be affirmed.
that Utah has a venue

statute consistent with and

The fact

similar to

Florida law shows that Utah and Florida public policies will both
be promoted by requiring this case to be litigated in Florida.
Jackett, 771 P.2d

at 1077

similar

statutes

immunity

statute); K.D.F.,
Kansas

venue

(fact that Utah and California have
favored

application

878 S.W.2d at 592, 595

statute

See

requiring

suits

of

California

(Texas court applied

against

certain

Kansas

government entity to be filed in Kansas, in part because Texas has
similar statute that serves purpose of minimizing litigation costs
borne by taxpayers); Baldwin, 545 A.2d at 203 (extension of comity
and application of New York law supported by similar statutes and
public policies in New York and New Jersey) ; University of Iowa
Press, 440 S.E.2d at 205 (comity extended because immunity statutes
in two states were conceptually the same).
As noted by the trial court, the bulk of the evidence in this
case, including the actual goods that are the subject of this suit,
are located in Florida.

The heart of this business transaction

also occurred in Florida.

(See, e.g.. R. 71-72, 302 at pp. 10, 12-
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13.)

The contract was negotiated and entered into in Broward

County, Florida, all bids were issued from and were received and
accepted in Broward County, Florida, and the goods were to be (and
actually were) delivered from various locations to Broward County,
Florida, where they remain in storage.

(R. 3, 71-72, 163, 302 at

p. 12.) The convenience of the Florida forum therefore supports the
extension of comity in this case.

See, e.g., Simmons, 670 P.2d at

1385-86 (fact that critical evidence and witnesses were located in
Oregon supported extension of comity and requirement that suit
against agency of State of Oregon be brought in Oregon).
Extending comity to the State of Florida in this case also
promotes good business relationships and commercial activity.
Broward

County—which

conducted

all

of

its

business

relative to this suit in Broward County—suddenly

If

activity

finds itself

subject to suit in faraway jurisdictions, it will be far less
likely to enter future business transactions with Utah businesses.
Where possible, Broward County will have a strong incentive to
avoid doing business with Utah entities, choosing instead to deal
with businesses located in Florida or in jurisdictions that are
cooperative in extending comity.

See Simmons, 670 P.2d at 1385

(noting that failure to extend comity to Oregon could jeopardize
the availability of valuable medical services provided by Oregon
Department of Health).
Furthermore, Florida law applies to this case, either because
of a choice of law provision in the contract or because of basic
-23-

choice of law principles.

(See infra Section IV.)

Florida courts

obviously have a far greater interest—and more experience — in
interpreting their own laws than do Utah courts.

In this case it

is a Florida court, not a Utah court, that should interpret and
apply Florida law.

See, e.g., Ramsden, 695 S.W.2d at 459-60 (fact

that Illinois substantive law governed contractual dispute favored
extension of comity and requirement that State of Illinois be sued
in Illinois courts).
Certain cases referred to above are also so factually similar
that they practically compel dismissal of this case.

For example,

in Baldwin, the New Jersey court declined to exercise jurisdiction
over the New York town of Warwick.

In that case--like this case—a

private corporation brought a breach of contract action in a New
Jersey court against a New York town.

The appellate court affirmed

dismissal of the case despite the fact that the defendant town had
sufficient minimum contacts to allow the New Jersey court to obtain
personal jurisdiction over it.
mental

concepts

of

comity

The court reasoned that "funda-

and

public

convenience"

dismissal in favor of the New York entity.

warranted

545 A.2d at 202.

The

Baldwin court weighed competing policies of each state (New York
and New Jersey), giving special deference to the policies of New
York, the defendant's home state.
that the public policies

Ld. at 203.

of both

states were

exercising restraint in this kind of case."
The
Carbonic,

Baldwin
the

court

New

relied

Jersey

on Liquid

court
-24-

The court concluded

also

"best

served by

Id. at 204.
Carbonic.

declined

In Liquid
to

exercise

jurisdiction over the City of New York, and refused to enforce a
default judgment entered in a New Jersey court against the City of
New York.

The court reasoned that a breach of contract action

against a municipal subdivision is "local in nature and must be
brought in the jurisdiction where it is situated."

374 A.2d at

1258.
In K.D.F.r a Kansas governmental entity ("KPERS") loaned money
to Texas Hydrogen Energy Corporation ("Hydrogen").

Hydrogen sued

KPERS in Texas, claiming that Hydrogen was unable to sell certain
land because KPERS wrongfully
interest in the property.

refused

to release

878 S.W.2d at 591.

its

security

A Kansas venue

statute required all actions against KPERS be filed in Shawnee
County, Kansas.
the

State

Xd. at 592.

The K.D.F. court extended comity to

of Kansas, applied

dismissal of the Texas action.

Kansas' venue

law, and

required

Jd. at 593-98.3

3

Cases cited by Trillium are easily distinguishable and/or
wholly inapplicable. See. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426 (1979)
(court held only that constitution does not prevent state courts
from exercising jurisdiction over other states; court actually
encouraged states to extend comity); Biscoe v. Arlington County,
738 F.2d 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Virginia police officer caused car
accident in D . C ; application of Virginia's more protective
government
immunity
statutes
offended
compelling
policies
underlying D.C.fs more limited governmental immunity laws); Skipper
v. Prince George's County. 637 F. Supp. 638 (D.D.C. 1986) (similar
to Biscoe) ; Peterson v. State of Texas, 635 P.2d 241 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1981) (offending state's activities—negligently allowing
juvenile delinquent to escape and steal car—all occurred in forum
state); Kent County v. Shepherd, 713 A.2d 290 (Del. 1998) (Maryland
sheriff caused car accident in Delaware; application of Maryland's
more protective government immunity statutes offended policies of
Delaware); Streubin v. Iowa, 322 N.W.2d 84 (Iowa 1982) (car
accident caused by Illinois1 negligence in Iowa; Illinois statutory
limits on recovery offended policies of Iowa); Hillhouse v. City of
Kansas, 559 P.2d 1148 (Kan. 1977) (Kansas City, Missouri had to go
-25-

This Court should follow the lead of Jackett, K.D.F., Baldwin,
and numerous other cases by extending

comity

to the State of

Florida and enforcing Florida's mandatory venue laws.

By extending

comity and affirming dismissal of this case, the Court would not
only promote wise policy, harmonious interstate relations, and
respect for the laws of other states; the Court would also enforce
a Florida venue law that is consistent with Utah's own venue
statute,
II.

UTAH'S VENUE STATUTE REQUIRES A SUIT AGAINST BROWARD COUNTY TO
BE BROUGHT IN BROWARD COUNTY.
This Court should extend comity to Florida, apply Florida's

venue law to this case, and affirm the trial court's dismissal of
this case.
dismissal

In addition, even if comity were not extended, the
should

be

affirmed

under

Utah's

own

venue

statute

relating to counties.

no further than across Missouri River to defend case in Kansas
City, Kansas); Hansford v. District of Columbia, 617 A.2d 1057 (Md.
1993) (court did not even mention principle of comity; ruling was
based solely on court's jurisdiction, not comity); Wendt v. County
of Osceloa, 289 N.W.2d 67 (Minn. 1979) (court did not even mention
principle of comity; focal point of wrongful acts was partially in
Minnesota; multiple suits and inconsistent verdicts could result if
jurisdiction not exercised); Hernandez v. City of Salt Lakef 686
P.2d 251 (Nev. 1984) (not a comity case; wrongful acts occurred in
Nevada; plaintiff would be deprived of remedy if forced to sue in
Utah); Mianecki v. Second Judicial District Court, 658 P.2d 422
(Nev. 1983) (Wisconsin parolee comitted sexual offenses in Nevada;
Wisconsin's immunity laws offended Nevada policies relating to
injurious acts committed within Nevada); Erhlich-Bober & Co. v.
University of Houston, 404 N.E.2d 726 (N.Y. 1980) (commercial
transaction was centered in New York; New York had strong interest
in maintaining its status as preeminent financial nerve center of
world by assuring ready access to forum for redress of injuries
arising out of New York-centered transactions).
-26-

Ignoring the plain language of the statute, Trillium argues
that Utahfs venue statute requiring counties to be sued in their
home county does not apply to counties located in states other than
Trillium1s argument is legally incorrect.

Utah.

The first fundamental rule of statutory construction is that
the plain language of a statute controls.
970 P.2d 1221, 1229 (Utah 1998).

E.g. , State v. Rudolph,

A court will not look beyond the

plain language of a statute unless the language is ambiguous.
E.g., Coleman v. Thomas, 2000 UT 53, 5 9, 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 12.
Courts may not infer substantive terms into a statute that are not
already

there.

Courts have no power to rewrite a statute to

conform to an intention not expressed.

Rudolph, 970 P.2d at 1299.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-3 is plain and unambiguous.

It states,

in relevant part, "An action against a county may be commenced and
tried in such county . . . "

Trillium would rewrite the statute to

apply only to a county "of this State."
statute says.
county."
the

But that is not what the

The plain wording of the statute applies to "a

Broward County is "a county" within the plain language of

statute

just

as

much

as

any

county

located

in

Utah.

Accordingly, Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-3 provides that the proper
venue for a suit against Broward County is in Broward County.
trial

court

therefore

did

not

complaint.
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err

in

dismissing

The

Trillium1 s

III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED ARGUMENTS CONTAINED IN
BROWARD COUNTY'S REPLY MEMORANDUM.
As an aside from the real or primary issues in this case,
Trillium complains that the trial court should not have considered
Broward County's reply memorandum in support of its motion to
dismiss.
A.

The trial court properly considered the reply memorandum.
Standard of Review

Again, Trillium misstates the applicable standard of review.
The proper standard of review is an abuse of discretion standard.
A court, "in its

discretion,

may decide a case upon any points that

its proper disposition may require, even if first raised in a reply
brief."

Romrell v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, N.A., 611 P.2d 392, 395

(Utah 1980) (emphasis added).

See also Boyd v. Davis, 897 P.2d

1239, 1243 (Wash. 1995) (holding it was within the discretion of
the appellate court to decide issue regardless of which, if any,
brief addressed it) .
Although Romrell appears to have been speaking in terms of the
Utah Supreme Court's power to consider arguments raised for the
first time in an appellant's reply brief, there is no reason the
Romrell rule should not apply here.

First, if this Court has

discretion to consider an argument raised for the first time in a
reply brief on appeal, then certainly this Court can base its
decision on arguments that Trillium claims were raised for the
first time in a reply memorandum below.

Second, the Rules of

Appellate Procedure specifically prohibit new matter in a reply
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brief.

Rule 24(c), Utah R. App. P.

Nevertheless, an appellate

court has discretion to consider such arguments if necessary for a
proper

disposition

of

the

case.

Romrell, supra.

reasoning and logic applies to trial courts.

This

same

Trial courts are in

at least as good a position, perhaps better, to exercise appropriate discretion on whether to consider arguments in a reply
memorandum.

Furthermore, trial courts are not bound by an express

Rule of Civil Procedure that prohibits new arguments in a reply, as
are Utah appellate courts.

Thus, the rule of discretion stated in

Romrell applies with force to trial courts, and, even if it does
not, the Romrell rule permits this Court to consider all arguments
necessary for a proper disposition of the case.
B.

Broward Countyfs Reply Memorandum Was Proper.

As a threshold matter, this Court should rule that Broward
County's reply memorandum was proper because the reply memorandum
addressed issues raised in Trillium1s response memorandum.
analysis is simple.

The

In its opening memorandum, Broward County

argued that Florida law applies, and that under Florida law this
suit should have been brought in Broward County, Florida, not Utah.
In its response, Trillium argued that Utah law applies, and that
under Utah law this suit was properly brought in Utah.

In reply to

that argument, Broward County properly argued that, even if Utah
law applies, this suit still should have been brought in Florida
because (1) Utah's venue statute requires counties to be sued where
they are located and

(2) Utah law recognizes the principle of
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comity, under which this case should be pursued in Florida, not
Utah.
Thus,

Broward

Trillium1s

argument

distraction

from

County's
to

the

the

real

reply
contrary

issues

memorandum

was

proper.

is

more

than

in this

nothing
case

and

should

a
be

rejected out of hand.
C.

In Any Event, the Trial Court Properly Considered Broward
County's Reply Memorandum.

Even if one were

to incorrectly

assume, for the sake of

argument, that Broward County's reply memorandum raised new issues,
the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion by considering
it.

Tne purpose behind the general rule that "a court will not

consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief"4 is to
prevent the court from considering issues to which the nonmovmg
party has no opportunity to respond. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d at
1003-04

^"Allowing the moving party to raise new issues in its

rebuttal materials is improper because the nonmovmg party has no
opportunity to respond.").

See also Crowther v. New York, 692

N.Y.S.2d 439, 440 ^N.Y. S. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (rejecting argument
that issue was improperly raised in reply brief since "plaintiff
had an opportunity to and did respond and both the appellants and
the plaintiff have fully briefed the issue on appeal"); Boyd v.
Davis, supra.

And, as noted above, the Romrell court acknowledged

4

State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 701 n. 8 (Utah Ct. App.
1995), quoting State v. Phathammavong. 860 P.2d 1001, 1003-04 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993) .
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an exception to the general rule when a proper disposition of the
case requires consideration of issues raised for the first time in
a reply brief.
These considerations apply here with force. Trillium had—and
capitalized o n — a full and fair opportunity to address any and all
relevant issues both in written memoranda and in oral arguments.
More

specifically,

Trillium

submitted

a

ten-page

"surreply"

memorandum with its complete analysis of the applicable Utah venue
statute and the comity issue.

(R. 240-49.)

In fact, the sections

of Trillium1s opening brief on appeal dealing with the Utah venue
statute and comity are essentially a verbatim duplication of its
surreply memorandum.
pp. 26-31.)

(Compare R. 243-49 with Appellant's Brief,

Trillium also was given, and took advantage of, a full

and fair opportunity to address Utah's venue statute and the comity
issue at oral argument before the trial court.
5-14, 19-22.)

(See R. 302 at pp.

Given the fact that Trillium's argument in its

appeal brief is a verbatim copy of its trial court memorandum,
together with the fact that Trillium1s oral arguments to the trial
court addressed all relevant issues, Trillium is hard pressed to
say

that

it had no opportunity

to respond

to all of Broward

Countyf s arguments.
The trial court's consideration of Broward County's reply
memorandum should also be affirmed because to do otherwise would be
a senseless waste of judicial resources.

If the trial court's

ruling were reversed and the reply memorandum disregarded, Broward
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County could be forced to file a new motion to dismiss.

The

parties would have to re-brief the same motion, and the trial court
would have to re-hear the same arguments on the motion and make a
decision.

The case would then likely be appealed to this Court

once again.

All of that would have to occur even though all of the

issues were squarely before the trial court and are now squarely
before this Court.

A more wasteful use of time and

resources would be hard to imagine.

judicial

For these reasons, the Court

should affirm the rulings of the trial court, which considered
Broward County's reply memorandum and granted Broward County's
Motion to Dismiss.
IV.

FLORIDA SUBSTANTIVE LAW APPLIES TO THIS SUIT.
Trillium

dispute.

argues

that

Florida

law does not

apply

to this

Florida law does, however, apply, due to the parties1

choice of law and/or common law conflict of laws rules.

Because

Florida law applies, a Florida court should interpret that law and
apply it to this case.
law

requires

that

Broward County.
A.

Furthermore, it is undisputed that Florida

suits

against

Broward

County be pursued

in

See supra p. 12.

The Parties Have Expressly Agreed that Florida Law
Governs the Contract and the Parties' Contractual
Relationship.

The language of the contract requires application of Florida
law to the contract between Broward County and Trillium.
contract states:
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The

Applicable provisions of all Federal, State,
County and local laws, and of all ordinance,
rules
and
regulations
including
the
Procurement of Broward County shall govern
development, submittal and evaluation of bids
received in response hereto and shall govern
any and all claims and disputes which may
arise between person (s) submitting a bid in
response hereto and Broward County by and
through its officers, employees and authorized
representatives, or any other person natural
or otherwise. Lack of knowledge by any bidder
shall not constitute a recognizable defense
against the legal effect thereof,
(R. 77.)

This passage, to which Trillium agreed to be bound,

mandates the application of Florida law.

Florida law governs "any

and all disputes which may arise" between the parties.
Trillium argues that this choice of law provision is unclear
because it does not mention the word "Florida."

The choice of law

provision does, however, refer to all "State, County and local
laws, and of all ordinance, rules and regulations including the
Procurement

of Broward

County."

interpretation of this phrase.

Trillium offers no plausible
The only common sense interpre-

tation of this provision—at least by one who takes the time to
read it, which Trillium apparently did not--is that the laws of
Florida shall apply.
Utah courts enforce contractual choice of law provisions.

See

American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 927 P.2d
186, 188 (Utah 1996) (questions involving contractual obligations
are determined by the law chosen by the parties).

In this case,

the parties agreed to have Florida law govern their contractual
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obligations, including any disputes arising out of the contract.
That law applies to this lawsuit.
B.

Florida Law Would Apply to this Case Even in the Absence
of an Effective Choice of Florida Law.

Florida law applies to this case because the parties agreed to
apply Florida law.

Florida law would apply to this case even

absent the choice of law provision in the contract, based upon
general choice of law rules that apply when the parties have not
effectively agreed upon the law of a specific forum.

In such

cases, Utah follows the choice of law provisions of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflicts of Laws.
188-91

(Utah 1996)

E.g. ,

American Nat'l, 927 P.2d at

(applying Section 188 of the Restatement and

applying Idaho law).
There are four important sections of the Restatement that
would apply in this case in the absence of an effective choice of
law by the parties.

Those sections are Sections 6, 188, 191 and

196. The text of each of those sections is part of the Addendum to
this brief.
Section 191 states the rule that applies most directly to the
facts of this case.
choice

of

It states that, in the absence of an effective

law provision,

the

rights

and duties

created

by a

contract for the sale of chattels is governed by the law of the
state in which the seller is to deliver the chattels, unless some
other state has a more significant relationship to the transaction
and

the parties.

Section

196

states
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the

identical

rule

for

contracts

for

the

rendition

of

services.

In this

case, the

contract required Trillium to deliver and install all goods and
services in Florida.

(See R. 2-3, 72, 162.)

Thus, Florida law

applies to this case because the goods were to be delivered and
installed in Florida.
Sections 6 and 188 of the Restatement also require application
of Florida law in this case.

Section 6 lists seven factors that

are to be considered in resolving conflicts of laws questions.
Those factors are:
•

The needs of the interstate and international systems;

•

The relevant policies of the forums;

•

The

relevant

polices

of

other

interested

states

and

the

relative interests of those states in the determination of the
particular issue;
•

The protection of justified expectations;

•

The basic policies underlying the particular field of law;

•

Certainty, predictability and uniformity of result; and

•

Ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied.
Section 188 gives concrete guidance on how to apply these

factors in breach of contract cases.

Section 188 requires the

Court to consider the following:
•

The place of contracting (which, in this case, is Florida (R.
71-72));
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•

The place of negotiation of the contract (which, in this case,
is Florida (R. 71));

•

The place of performance (which, in this case, is Florida (R.
72, 302 at pp. 6, 12));

•

The location of the subject matter of the contract (which, in
this case, is Florida (R. 3, 302 at p. 12)); and

•

The domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties (which, in this case, is
Florida for Broward County, a political subdivision of the
State of Florida (R. 2, 15).)
As the Court can see, every one of the relevant considerations

set forth in Section 188 focuses on Florida.

Florida is by far the

state with the most significant relationship to the parties and the
transactions involved in this case.

Thus, even if there were no

choice of Florida law provision in the contract (which there is),
Florida law would still govern in this case.

The fact that Florida

law applies supports the trial court's ruling that this case should
be litigated in Florida.
V.

See supra p. 23-24.

REGARDLESS OF WHICH STATE'S SUBSTANTIVE LAW APPLIES, THIS CASE
SHOULD BE LITIGATED IN FLORIDA.
Trillium argues that, regardless of which state's substantive

law applies, Utah procedural law applies.
unavailing for two reasons.

Trillium1s position is

First, Utah procedural law requires

that a suit against a county be pursued in that county.
is discussed above

That issue

(Section II) and need not be repeated here.
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Second, the principle of comity, which applies to both substantive
and procedural law, requires that this case be litigated in Florida
courts.
The

Jackett

case

makes

it

clear

that,

in

appropriate

circumstances, comity will require the application of a foreign
statefs procedural laws.
court did.

In fact, that is exactly what the Jackett

The Jackett court dismissed a case against a California

political entity based on statute of limitations grounds.

See 771

P.2d at 1075-77.

Statutes of limitation are procedural in nature,

not substantive.

Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 575 (Utah 1993);

State v. Jacoby, 1999 UT App. 52, SI 12, 975 P.2d 939.

See also

K.D.F. v. Rex, 878 S.W.2d 589, 595 (Tex. 1994) (extending comity to
State of Kansas by enforcing Kansas venue statute).
Thus, it ultimately makes little difference whether Utah or
Florida substantive or procedural law applies.
day, both

Utah law and

litigated in Florida.

Florida

At the end of the

law require that this case be

For theses reasons, the trial court properly

dismissed this case with prejudice to the refiling of the case in
Utah, but without prejudice to the refiling of the case in Broward
County,

Florida.

The

judgment

of

affirmed.
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the

trial

court

should

be

CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing

reasons, the trial court's Order of

Dismissal should be affirmed.
DATED August 1, 2000.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Reed/L. Martineau
Keith A. Call
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee

-38-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

1ST

day of August, I caused

two true and correct copies of RESPONSE BRIEF OF APPELLEES in the
above-captioned matter (Supreme Court of the State of Utah Case No.
10000264, Trial Court No. 990904664CN) to be mailed postage prepaid, via U.S. Mail to the following:
Eric A. Christensen, Attorney
Shane D. Hillman, Attorney
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Post Office Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
DATED this 1st day of August, 2000.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

'^fe'ed L. Martineau
Keith A. Call
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ADDENDUM
1.

Order of Dismissal entered March 8, 2000

2.

Transcript of Oral Argument on Broward County's Motion to

Dismiss
3.

Jackett v. Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power, 771 P.2d

1074 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
4.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-3 (1996)

5.

Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 6 (1971)

6.

Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 188 (1971)

7.

Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 191 (1971)

8.

Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 196 (1971)
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ADDENDUM # 1

F!LED BJSTEfGT COURT
Thtrcl J-jdic.a! District

REED L. MARTINEAU (A2106)
KEITH A. CALL (A6708)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Telecopy:
(801) 363-0400

cpJty Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
-«Vr LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TRILLIUM USA, INC.,
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff,
vs.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
OF BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA,

Case No. 990904664CN
Judge David S. Young

Defendant.

Defendant Board of County Commissioners of Broward County,
Florida ("Broward County") has filed a Motion to Dismiss.

The

motion was fully briefed by both parties and oral argument was
heard on February 25, 2000.

Having been fully apprised, and for

good cause appearing, the Court finds as follows:
For the reasons stated in the memoranda submitted by Broward
County and for the reasons stated by the Court at oral argument,
venue in this case is more appropriate in Broward County, Florida,

than it is in this Court.

This Court should therefore refrain from

exercising jurisdiction in this case. Accordingly, for the reasons
stated in Broward County's memoranda and for the reasons stated by
the Court at oral argument,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this case is
dismissed in its entirety with prejudice to the refiling of this
lawsuit in courts within the State of Utah, but without prejudice
to the refiling of this case in Broward County, Florida.
party shall bear its own costs and attorneys fees.

Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Each

NOTICE OF FZhim
Notice is hereby given that this Order will be filed with the
Court on March 16, 2000 if no objections are raised by counsel for
Plaintiff.

Alternatively, this Order will be promptly filed with

the Court upon receipt

(by Defendant's counsel) of the Order

approved as to form by Plaintiff's counsel.
DATED this

yjV\

day of March, 2000.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By
eed L. Martineau
teith A. Call
Attorneys for Defendant

N:\20225\1\ORDER.DIS
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£<&>

Certificate of

Service

Kay I. Brown states that she is employed in the law offices of
Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for Defendant herein; that
she served the attached ORDER OF DISMISSAL, Case No. 990904664CN,
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
upon the following parties by placing a true and correct copy
thereof in an envelope to:

Mr. Erik A. Christiansen
Parsons, Eehle & Latimer
201 South Main, Suite 1800
Post Office Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorneys for Plaintiff

and causing the £ame to be
J3
mailed first class, postage pre-paid,
•
hand delivered,
on the j> -^

day

of

March, 2000.

uP.

^6Un^-J

Kay I. Brown

ADDENDUM #2

$

>V

*N8^K

QzmkAL

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,, „

_,_„.„,„

COURT
PILED-<*DISTRICT
'.•'"-'-"inijrtrict

TRILLIUM USA,

MAR 1 0 IW

INC,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 990904664

vs.
BROWARD COUNTY FLORIDA,
et al,

Defendant.

Hearing
Electronically Recorded on
February 25, 2000
BEFORE:

THE HONORABLE DAVIS S. YOUNG
Third District Court Judge

For the Plaintiff:

Erik A. Christiansen
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
201 S. Main #1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Telephone: (801)532-1234

For the Defendant;

Keith Call
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN &
MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place #1100
Salt Lake City, 84111
Telephone: (801)521-9000

Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe RPR/CSR/CCT
1771 SOUTH CALIFORNIA AVENUE
PROVO, UTAH 8460 6
TELEPHONE: (801)377-0027

1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on February 25, 2000)

3

THE COURT:

4

Let's then consider the matter

of Trillium USA, Inc. vs. the Board of County

5

| Commissioners, Broward County, Florida, 990904664.

6

this matter, counsel, your appearances, please.

7

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

8

Christiansen.

On

Your Honor, Erik

I'm appearing on behalf of the

i

9
10

I plaintiff, Trillium USA, Inc.
J

11
12

MR. CALL:

Keith Call, (Inaudible)

Christensen and Mark Nelson for defendant, Broward
J County, your Honor.

13

THE COURT:

14

All right, and this is your

motion, Mr. Call?

15

j

MR. CALL:

16

j

THE COURT:

17

MR. CALL:

Yes, your Honor.
You may proceed.
Your Honor, the relevant facts of

18

this case are very simple.

19

political subdivision of the State of Florida.

20

near Fort Lauderdale by the way just north of Miami.

21

I

Broward County is a
It's

In about August of 1995 Broward County

22

entered into a contract with Trillium, the plaintiff

23

in this action.

24
25

The contract required Trillium to

I supply goods and services to Broward County's fleet of
vehicles located in Broward County.

3

What they were doing was converting those
gas powered vehicles to natural gas powered vehicles,
and Trillium was to supply the goods and the services
to convert those vehicles.
The contract was created by an invitation to
bid, which was issued from Broward County.

The

invitation to bid was completed by Trillium, was
returned to Broward County where it was accepted and
the contract was consummated.

As I mentioned, the

goods were to be delivered and installed in Broward
County.
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:

By whom would they be installed?
By Trillium.

Trillium has now

sued Broward County claiming that the county breached
that contract.

We're not here to discuss the merits.

We deny that we've breached that contract, obviously,
but at issue here is whether Broward County, a
political subdivision of the State of Florida, may be
hauled into court here in Utah based on that breach of
contract claim.
A couple of other simple but relevant facts.
The contract has a choice of law provision, which
states that Florida law will be applied.
THE COURT:

applies.

I'm convinced that Florida law

4

MR. CALL:

I think Trillium disputes that,

but I'm pleased to hear that you agree with that
point,
THE COURT:

It (inaudible) from reading, but

of course I will hear from you in opposition,
MR. CALL:

Sure.

Also under Florida law,

your Honor, it is clear that a county can only be sued
in the county where the (inaudible).
has to be sued in Broward County.

Broward County

There's no real

dispute about that part of Florida law.

Incidentally

the law is the same in Utah.
THE COURT:

It makes your argument easy,

doesn't it?
MR. CALL:
THE COURT:

Yeah, if you want to sue-Maybe what you ought to do is

preserve your argument for reply.
MR. CALL:

If you'd like me to do so I'd be

happy to, your Honor.
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:
THE COURT:

All right, thank you.
Okay, thank you.
Do you feel like you might be

losing?
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

I'm kind of surprised by

that, given the case law.
THE COURT:

Tell me why you are.

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

1

Well, this is a simple

2

collection case.

3

made between a Utah citizen, a company that is located

4

here, where all of its employees are here, where --

5

did a commercial transaction with a municipal

6

corporation, that was done interstate.

7

the rights of Utah citizens, it involved a Florida

8

municipality, and--

9
10

THE COURT:

13
14
15
16
17

It involved

But everything that was done was

fundamentally done in Florida.

11
12

It's a simple commercial contract

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

That's not true, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay, help me with the

composition, then.
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

The affidavit of Jan Home

that's before your Honor-THE QOURT:

I might say' you did give me some

18

reading material, and I will say that I have not read

19

it all, and I have not been able to, but I have the

20

affidavit of Jan Home.

21

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

The affidavit of Jan Home

22

is very clear that substantial portions of the

23

contract were fulfilled in Utah.

24
25

THE COURT:

Give me the specifics , that's

! what I'dk like to know is what was (inaudibl.e) .

6

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

All the parts that were

installed on these automobiles came from Utah.
THE COURT:

Well, sure.

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

And were shipped to

Florida.
THE COURT:

But all the working -- I mean

that means you made them here or you had them here and
you took them down there, but all the work you did you
did in Florida, didn't you?
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

The installation of the

compressed natural gas tanks, the conversion kits were
done in Florida, that's correct, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Sure.

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

But it doesn't really

matter-THE COURT:

What difference does it make to

Florida that you assembled the parts in Utah?

That

doesn't -- I mean you assemble the parts in Utah that
you sell to Florida, Montana, Washington.
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:
that fact is irrelevant.

The case law says that

What Utah's long arm statute

provides is if a Utah citizen has been harmed by
another party, they can sue them here.

They're just

like any other litigant.
What the defendant wants to come in here is

7

they want the privileges.

They want to say, "Well/

because we are a municipal corporation we're entitled
to different privileges than every other defendant in
the world."
If Joe Smith were a Florida resident and had
bought these compressed natural gas tanks from
Trillium Corp USA, it's not a jurisdiction question
it's a banking question.
THE COURT:

Right.

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

They bought them here.

I

don't think your Honor would have any question that we
could sue them in Utah as long as minimum contact
personal jurisdiction were satisfied.
THE COURT:

That's true, but--

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

The issue here is a venue

question.
THE COURT:

Well, I know it's a venue

question here, but in this case in addition you
have - - i f Joe Smith in Florida said, " I want to buy
these packs out here in Utah," and he comes out here
to Utah or he even communicates and he buys them here,
and then he takes them down there and he hires ABC
Automotive to install them, that's a totally different
case.
Florida is coming to you and they're saying

8

to you, "We want these automobiles converted in
Florida.

You bid, and we don't care what the -- we'll

take the lowest bidder giving us a converted vehicle
in Florida from wherever we receive these bids."

So

all of the -- and when you say this is venue not
jurisdiction, all of the business relationship from
venue standpoint occurred in Florida; am I wrong on
that?
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

Well, you're wrong about

the interpretation of the law because it is a venue
question, it's not a jurisdiction question.

I think

your Honor and the other side may be confused by that,
because indisputable United States Supreme Court
authority says, "Venue questions are procedural."
When procedural questions are at issue you look to the
law in Utah, the forum.

You don't look to the law of

Florida to decide whether or not venue is proper.
They're trying to get this case back in
Florida because Florida has an active statute which
says if you sue a Florida municipal corporation then
you've got to do it in the county where that municipal
corporation is located.
THE COURT:

Now doesn't Utah--

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

That's a venue provision,

it doesn't bind this Court, it's irrelevant to this

9

Court's consideration (inaudible).
THE COURT:

Okay/ but doesn't Utah have the

same statute?
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

It does, but the purpose

of that statute is obviously pursuing a Utah
municipality in Utah.

There's a venue provision to

decide whether that properly should be within the
State of Utah.

It doesn't have extra territorial

effects.
This is a venue question and it's a question
of what is the proper law to apply.

The US Supreme

Court says the proper law to apply is the law of Utah,
The law of Utah (inaudible) jurisdiction-THE COURT:

Well (inaudible) upon venue.

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

--recognizes that this is

the proper place to sue these guys.

Our client should

not be forced to go clear down to Florida to collect
$25,000 on a commercial contract.

It's perfectly

foreseeable to these guys that they can be hauled into
court here.

They sent a contract here, they entered

into a contract with us, they kept the goods that came
from this state, it is not unfair for them to expect
to be hauled into court in Utah.
It is unfair to expect my client that if
they breach the contract they have to go all the way

10

down to Florida, hire Florida counsel and be
hometowned down there.

It's just not fair when the

law is simply (inaudible).
THE COURT:

Well, I don't accept the notion

that someone will be quote, "hometowned" in a way that
would be unfair or inequitable to them because I
certainly would not do that in Utah from somebody that
was trying a case from Florida here.
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

That's fair enough, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

So I don't accept that.

But my

point of this from the fact situation that I'm
familiar with, and I acknowledge to you that I'm not
as familiar with this as you are, but that from what I
see, Florida basically just offered out to companies
in this business to come down and create conversions
of their vehicles, and your people did the work.

You

did it in Florida, you hired people to do it in
Florida, or however you did it, you sent your people
down there to do it in Florida, and the County of
Florida dealt with you there.
Now why shouldn't you be required to go back
there to collect what you were willing to do there?
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:
forums, your Honor.

We have a choice of
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THE COURT:

Well--

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:
Constitution allows.
statute allows.

That's what the

That's what Utah's long arm

This is a question about which

statute is more important, Utah's long arm statute
which I should read to you, your Honor.

It says

that -- if you'll bear with me a second I'll find it
(inaudible).
Utah's long arm statute says, "Its purpose
is to ensure a maximum protection to citizens of this
state."

Citizens of this state.

This is a company

that is a citizen of this state and is entitled to the
fullest maximum protection under Utah law that Utah's
long arm statute exists under the United States
Constitution.
The United States constitutional law by the
Supreme Court says we can bring this case here.

The

only question is what is more important, Utah's long
arm statute or Florida's internal venue statute.
THE COURT:

Okay, now let me ask you this

question about the venue aspect of it.
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:
THE COURT:

It's a venue case.

Okay, but this question, suppose

that -- your position is breach of contract, their
position may be faulty installation -- I'm just
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assuming.

If that's so, where are the witnesses?
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:
THE COURT:

The witnesses are here.

Your witnesses.

Where are

theirs?
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

They're here, they're in

Salt Lake City, Utah.
THE COURT:
down there.

How are they -- you did the work

They're witnesses who are going to -- you

had the vehicles down there.

Where is Exhibit A, the

faulty installed vehicle?
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:
warranty of the vehicles.

This isn't about the
This is about kits that

were delivered-THE COURT:

That are delivered (inaudible).

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

--which they refused to

accept and pay for.
THE COURT:

Yeah, they are still sitting

down there.
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

Yeah, we're paying for

them in storage down there.
THE COURT:

Right, I know that, but they're

in storage to be installed and they said they don't
want them, I guess.
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

These are all

jurisdiction questions, they are not venue questions.
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Our witnesses are here, we have an equal number of
witnesses here, they have an equal number of witnesses
there.

We have a choice of forums.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

And our forum is we can

sue in the State of Utah.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

There's no constitutional

prohibition against it, Utah's long arm statute is in
favor of it, venue law unquestionably is a procedural
law, and Utah law properly should be applied for
procedural issues.

Utah recognizes that this is an

issue that can be brought here and should be brought
here.
Municipal corporations are not immune from
suit in states just because they are a government
entity.

If they do business all over the US and have

vendors all over the US, it is perfectly foreseeable
and perfectly legitimate for those vendors, if that
municipality breaches its contract, to sue them where
they are located.
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:
about jurisdiction.

There's no dispute here

They haven't raised personal

jurisdiction as an issue.
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THE COURT:

Right.

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

They have (inaudible)

contacts with the State of Utah.
THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Christiansen.

Mr. Call?
MR. CALL:
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:

May I approach, your Honor?
You may.
Your Honor, I have handed you a

copy of Utah's venue statute that I referred to
earlier.

It says actions against the county -- "an

action against a county may be commenced and tried in
such county, unless such action is brought by the
county," and then a different rule applies.
Your Honor, Trillium argues that this
statute says an action against a Utah county may be
brought in such county, but it doesn't say that.

It

says an action against a county.
Broward County is a county, within the
meaning of this statute, and therefore has to be sued
in the State of Florida in Broward County under both
Utah law and under Florida's law.
Now I'd like to address this issue of venue
just a little bit.
THE COURT:

Wouldn't you think that this

statute (inaudible) was anticipating that this would

15

mean an action against a Utah county?
MR. CALL:

I don't know that, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Do you have any reason to

believe it would not be?

I mean do you have any

reason to believe that it means -- that the
legislature was thinking about any of 50,000 counties
throughout the nation?
MR. CALL:

The reason I think that is

because it says "a county" instead of a Utah county.
It could have easily said "a Utah county" in that
statute.
THE COURT:

Do you have any reason to

believe that it means one or the other?
MR. CALL:
nothing.

In addition to that, your Honor,

I don't know of any case law, I'm not

familiar with any legislative history that would
indicate one way or the other.
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:

Okay.
Now let me address the issue of

venue, and I'd like to address this in the context of
the concept of comity, your Honor, because I think
this is a very important concept that the Utah court
of appeals has given us some very specific direction
on.
Comity is a principle under which the court
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of one state will give effect to the laws of a sister
state, not as a rule of law, but out of respect or
deference for that other state's sovereignty and that
other state's rules and laws.

Comity makes good

cooperative sense, especially whereas in this case you
have two states that have similar laws, a county has
to be sued in the county•
We want Florida to promote and enforce
Utah's laws.

On the other side of that ledger, Utah

ought to promote and enforce Florida's laws.

In the

Jacket case, which was cited to you from the Utah
court of appeals, the Utah court of appeals gives five
reasons why comity ought to be extended, and those
five reasons all apply very -- with particularity in
this case.
Number one, according to the Jacket court,
comity should be extended to give primary regard to
the rights of their own -- Florida's own citizens,
namely Broward County.

In other words, Florida has an

interest in protecting its citizens, just as Utah has
an interest in protecting its citizens here.
That's particularly cogent in this case
where the defendant is a subdivision of the State of
Florida, whereas you have recognized, the goods were
to be delivered in Florida, they were to be installed
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in Florida, they exist today in Florida, and the
contractual relationship as you recognized was
centered in Florida.
The second reason is that comity should be
extended to promote harmony, to promote cooperation
and build good-will with sister states.

Now your

Honor, when I first read that I thought that's pretty
mushy, ought (inaudible) cooperation, what does that
mean?

But you know, it really has cogent meaning when

you read the cases.
In Texas, for example, a Texas judge -- one
of the first questions a Texas judge will ask me is
whether or not Florida is classified as a cooperative
state or an uncooperative state.

If they're

uncooperative, forget it, they won't extend comity.
If they're cooperative Texas is more likely to extend
comity.
Anticipating you'd ask me this same
question, your Honor, I did some research in
preparation for this hearing to figure out whether or
not Florida is cooperative or uncooperative.
Admittedly the case law is sparse.

I couldn't find a

case in Florida where a foreign city or county was
sued in Florida, but I did find a case that's
relevant, Hopkins vs. Laquita Aircraft, 201 S.2d 743.
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In that case a Florida plaintiff sued in
Florida for wrongful death, and the wrongful death
occurred in a plane crash that happened in Illinois.
Illinois has -- had at that time, I don't know if they
still do or not, but they had a wrongful death statute
that caps damages, and Florida has no similar cap on
damages under their wrongful death statute.
So the Florida Supreme Court based the
question, "Do we respect Illinois' cap on damages, or
do we apply Florida law with no cap on damages?"

The

Florida Supreme Court held that they would respect and
would apply the Illinois cap on damages in the
wrongful death case.
Now according to Texas that would make
Florida a cooperative state.

We ought to cooperate

and work with Florida and enforce their laws.
The Texas courts also note that in the
absence of a contrary indication we ought to presume
they are cooperative and build that (inaudible) of
cooperation.
Further, your Honor, giving effect to the
laws of Florida promotes business.

Now if Broward

County knows that by entering this contract with
Trillium that they lose the protections and whatnot
that they have in Florida, are they more or less
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likely to do business with people in Utah?

That's a

rhetorical question.
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:

That's all right, I understand.
The third reason indicated by the

Utah court of appeals to extend comity is to have
claims against a state litigated by that state's
courts.

Boy, that's compelling in this case where the

defendant is a subdivision of the State of Florida.
The fourth reason stated by the Utah court,
"To prevent forum shopping and avoid practical
problems involved in enforcing a judgment by one state
against another."

Now that sure applies here because

in the (inaudible) event that judgment is entered in
Broward County, where does this case end up?
THE COURT:

Okay, thank you.

Mr. Christiansen, do you have anything else
you want to indicate?
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

A couple real quick

points that I think -- since he brought up comity
(inaudible).
THE COURT:

Yes, I'll let you respond to

comity.
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

Really quickly with

respect to Utah's venue statute, which he started off
talking about, if you look at the Hamsford vs.
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District of Columbia case, which is in our brief, it
involves a very similar situation, they said that
governs internal counties within the state.
case that was in Maryland.

It was a

I think it's right on

point, I think it takes care of that issue about what
Utah's venue statute means.
I think that this Court also when thinking
about comity should think about what Utah courts have
said about Utah's long arm statute.

Utah courts,

according to Starways, according to Synergistics,
which is Marathon Ranching, have said courts must
exercise jurisdiction over non-residents to the outer
most limits of the Constitution.

That is the purpose

of Utah's long arm statute, that's what our courts say
about it.
In contrast, Erewith vs. Bobber vs.
University of Houston and Hillhouse vs. Kansas City
say the purpose of venue statutes are to serve the
administrative convenience of the state.

That

interest is so much smaller than protecting our
citizens, the citizens of Utah from harm by out of
state non-residents.
With respect to the Jacket case, which was
the only case that is a Utah case that's discussed
anywhere in their papers, that case does not dictate
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that this case should be dismissed on the grounds of
comity.
Let me tell you about that case.
very interesting case.

It's a

I think if you read one case

today you ought to go back and read the Jacket case.
In that case the plaintiff was a California resident
(inaudible) Utah.

The defendant--

THE COURT:

Where did the event occur?

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

It was a helicopter crash

of a LA County helicopter that happened to fly over
the water in Utah and crash in Utah.

The plaintiff

was a California resident, the defendant was a
California resident, but there was a statute of
limitations problem in California so the plaintiff
there was forum shopping because Utah didn't have the
same statute of limitations.
So even though no one had any connection
with Utah except the crash happened to be here, they
came and forum shopped because if they would have
brought it in California there would have been a
statute of limitations problem.
There's no forum shopping here.

We could

have brought this case either way.
THE COURT:

Well--

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

We brought it here
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we're entitled to bring it here because we're located
here, and because as a citizen of the State of Utah
we're entitled to the protection of our court system.
That's why it's here.

That case is distinguishable on

all fours.
I would say that in closing comity is
appropriate where you can see that someone is trying
to unfairly take advantage of a situation, forum
shopping, special laws, that case trying to take
advantage of a different statute involving the
Illinois law versus the Florida law.
This isn't that case, it's a simple
commercial breach of contract.
THE COURT:

Well, you say that, but it seems

to me that every vendor dealing with Broward County
would know that they -- that Broward County is
requesting them to come to Broward County to convert
their vehicles.
Now your product that's in storage in
Broward County was shipped to Broward County.

They

refused to accept them, I'm assuming, to allow you to
install them into their vehicles which would be the
ultimate conclusion of the agreement.
So you want to sue them here and cause them
to come out here to Utah, respond to the damages, then
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they have to go -- whoever prevails/ they have to go
back to Broward County and pick them up and bring them
back here, or pick them up and install them in the
vehicles, whatever the situation is.
It seems to me that Trillium knew when
Trillium got into the agreement with Broward County
that the whole performance of that agreement was to be
conducted in Broward County, was negotiated from
Broward County, and that Trillium, in desiring to do
its business, desired to sell these items to anybody
in the United States, and particularly to governmental
units and entities that were willing to convert.
Trillium, you say, clearly could have filed
it in either place.

It seems to me that the witnesses

are more available in Broward County, that the
agreement was conducted more in Broward County, that
Florida law applies more to Utah law in this case, and
therefore if Trillium can do it in both places they
ought to do it in the forum where the witnesses and
the defendant -- the normal law is that you go to the
county of the defendant to file your lawsuit.
If you have two citizens in Utah that are
involved in some transaction between them you
usually -- now I'm saying there can be exceptions to
this, but you usually go to the location of the
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defendant.

That's the traditional way,
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

That would (inaudible) to

the long arm statute on (inaudible).
THE COURT:

I don't think so,

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

The purpose of long arm

statutes is so when citizens of Utah have been wronged
they can sue people in the State of Utah to the full
(inaudible) of the Constitution.

That's telling my

client, "If you do business outside of the State of
Utah with anybody, even though that business goes back
and forth from both states, tough, you've got to go to
another state because you're a company that does
business all over the US, you can't sue anybody in
Utah where you pay taxes."

That's what that's telling

my client.
THE COURT:

Usually the long arm statute

deals with the concepts of minimum contacts, and the
minimum contacts with the State of Utah are -- we look
at those ca^^s and we try to see if they have had -if this has had enough contact with Utah to make it
reasonable to expect that the parties could know that
they both should be subject to Utah's jurisdiction.
Nrv.» my view of this is the greater weight of
the evidence is that both parties knew that they were
entering into an agreement in Florida.

Now I know you
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say "so what," basically.
they have the choice."

You say, "So what, still

I don't read the long arm

statute to read that we ought to prefer Utah.

I read

it to say that it will grant Utah jurisdiction over
many matters with its quote, "long arm," but that
doesn't mean that that's the better forum.
In this case the Court finds that the
defendant's motion to dismiss should be in the same is
granted.

I'll ask you, Mr. Call, to prepare an order

consistent with the Court's ruling and consistent with
your pleadings on this matter.
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

One point of

clarification, your Honor, just for the record.
THE COURT:

Certainly.

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

There was no evidence

before this Court by affidavit or otherwise about the
location of the witnesses, and so to the extent your
Honor is drawing conclusions about the location of
those witnesses, I think those conclusions are lacking
and (inaudible).
THE COURT:

Okay, and I accept that.

I was

just telling you what I have observed from the way the
contract was created, the way the work was to be done,
and it seems to me that we know that all -- that
Trillium was transporting these to Florida, Trillium
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was installing them into the vehicles, giving a fully
converted vehicle to Broward County at the conclusion
of whatever Trillium's work was.
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

I'd be more than happy

just to provide affidavit evidence for your Honor, if
you would like, about the location of the witnesses.
THE COURT:

Well, I--

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

I think you would find

that evidence will show, as a proffer, the majority of
the witnesses are in the State of Utah.
THE COURT:

I'd probably find the Trillium

witnesses are in Utah and the Broward County witnesses
are in Florida, is probably what I'd find.
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

Just for the record, your

Honor.
THE COURT:
MR. CALL:
THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Christiansen
Thank you, your Honor.
All right, if you'll prepare the

order, Mr. Call?
MR. CALL:
THE COURT:
(Hearing concluded)

Yes.
All right.
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secutive term of five years to life for being
a habitual criminal in violation of Utah
statute 7 and double jeopardy provisions of
the federal and Utah constitutions.8 We
agree.
Utah's habitual criminal statute does not
create a new crime, but rather enhances
punishment for the latest substantive offense.9 As we recently noted in State v.
Stilling, "Since no crime exists, there can
be no sentence. Assigning a separate sentence for recidivism does more than enhance punishment for the latest crime, it
penalizes an individual for past convictions." 10 In Stilling, we held that the
sentence for being a habitual criminal
should be merged with the sentence for the
underlying substantive offense to create
one enhanced sentence.11 That result is
also appropriate in this case. Defendant
should receive one enhanced sentence of
five years to life for second degree burglary and for being a habitual criminal.
We vacate the sentences and remand to
the trial court for resentencing consistent
with this opinion.
HOWE, ASSOCIATE C.J., and DURHAM
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
STEWART, Justice, concurs in the
result.

SYSTEM>

Arthur JACKETT, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF
WATER AND POWER, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 880040-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 17, 1989.
California resident brought suit
against California governmental entity for
injuries arising from helicopter crash in
Utah. The Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, J. Dennis Frederick, J., granted
defendant's motion to dismiss on limitations grounds, and plaintiff appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held that
trial court, as matter of comity, could apply
two-year, California statute of limitations.
Affirmed.
1. Courts <&=*511
Decision to apply comity rests within
sound discretion of trial court.
2. Limitation of Actions <$=>2(3)
Trial court, as matter of comity, could
apply two-year, California statute of limitations to plaintiffs tort law claims, where
both parties to suit were residents of California, Utah's only contact was purely fortuitous one as site of crash, and plaintiff
had brought suit in Utah only after California statute of limitations had run. West's
Ann.Cal.Gov.Code § 810 et seq.; U.C.A.
1953, 63-30-1 to 63-30-38, 78-12-45.
3. Courts <*=>511
Of primary importance in deciding
whether to apply comity is whether policies

7. Utah Code Ann. § 76-S-10O1 (1978).
8. VS. Const, amends. V, XIV; Utah Const, art. I,
§ 12.
9. See State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137 (Utah 1989).
10. Id

11. Id; see also State v. Nielson, 25 Utah 2d 11,
12-13, 474 P.2d 725, 726 (1970) (trial court instructed to merge habitual criminal sentence of
not less than fifteen years with arson sentence
of one to ten years to create one enhanced
sentence of not less than fifteen years).
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of forum state would be contravened if
comity were extended.

a complaint against L.A. Water within two
years of the date of the injury, as required

A ^

by the

^

^-ir*i

4. Courts e=»511
Reasons supporting extension of comity may include state's need to give primary
regard to rights of its own citizens, to
foster cooperation, promote harmony and
build goodwill with sister states, to have
claims against state litigated by that
state's own courts, and to prevent forum
shopping and avoid practical problems involved in enforcing judgment by one state
against another.

William W. Downes, Jr., argued, Winder
& Haslam, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and
appellant
Robert W. Brandt and Michael P. Zaccheo, argued, Richards, Brandt, Miller &
Nelson, Salt Lake City, for defendant and
respondent.
Before BILLINGS, JACKSON and
ORME, JJ.

Act.

J
His claim bein

S time-barred in California,
subsequently filed suit in Utah on
J u n e 18 1987
>
« L A « W a t e r m o v e d to d i s '
miss
ackett s
J
' suit, arguing that as a matter
o f comit
y» U t a h s h o u l d a P P ^ C a l i f o r "
niVs two-year governmental immunity statu t e of
"citations. Jackett claimed the
court should a
P P ^ U t a h ' s four-year tort
s t a t u t e of
Imitations, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-25 (1987), as under normal conflict
of laws analysis the statute of limitations
of the forum governs. The trial court
agreed with L.A. Water and dismissed
Jackett's complaint,
Th e sing-le issue on appeal is whether the
trial court erred in applying, as a matter of
comity, the two-year statute of limitations
provided in California's Governmental
Claims Act, thus barring plaintiffs cause
of action in Utah. We note at the outset
that this is an issue of first impression in
Utah.
Jackett

OPINION

COMITY

BILLINGS, Judge:
The trial court granted respondent Los
Angeles Department of Water and Power's
("L.A. Water") motion to dismiss appellant
Arthur Jackett's ("Jackett") complaint
Jackett appeals from this decision, claiming
the trial court abused its discretion in applying, as a matter of comity, the two-year
statute of limitations found in California's
governmental immunity statute. We affirm.

[1] The decision to apply comity in a
particular case is fact sensitive. Therefore, courts have consistently found that
the decision to apply comity rests within
the sound discretion of the trial court. See
Mianecki v. Second Judicial Dist. Court,
99 Nev. 93, 658 P.2d 422, 425 (1983), cert
dismissed, 464 U.S. 806, 104 S.Ct 195, 78
L.Ed.2d 171 (1983); Robertson v. Estate of
McKnight, 591 S.W.2d 639, 642 (Tex.Civ.
App. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 609
S.W.2d 534 (Tex.1980); Nowell v. Nowell,
408 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex.Civ.App. 1966),
cert denied, 389 U.S. 847, 88 S.Ct 53, 19
L.Ed.2d 116 (1967).

PACTS
On April 25, 1985, Jackett was injured
when the helicopter in which he was riding
made an emergency landing near Cedar
City, Utah. The helicopter was owned and
operated by L.A. Water, a California governmental entity. Jackett, a resident of
California, claims his injuries were caused
by L.A. Water's negligent maintenance and
operation of the helicopter. Jackett filed a
timely notice of claim, under California's
Governmental Claims Act, but failed to file

[2] Jackett argues that because Utah's
borrowing statute, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-45 (1987), and Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to
-38 (1986), are inapplicable, the trial court
was required to apply Utah's four-year tort
statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-25 (1987). Jackett cites authority
supporting the proposition that under a
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general conflict of laws analysis, the limitations period of the forum applies. See, e.g.,
Rhoades v. Wright, 622 P.2d 343, 350 (Utah
1980), cert denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct.
397, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981); McGinn v.
Utah Power & Light Co., 529 P.2d 423, 424
(Utah 1974), overruled on other grounds,
Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n., 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983).
Although we agree with Jackett's analysis,
the trial court may, nevertheless, apply the
discretionary doctrine of comity to avoid
the result otherwise compelled by a general
conflict of laws analysis.
The United States Supreme Court has
ruled that while the full faith and credit
clause does not require it to do so, a forum
state may extend sovereign immunity to a
sister state as a matter of comity. Nevada
v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 420-27, 99 S.Ct. 1182,
1188-91, 59 L.Ed.2d 416 (1979). "It may be
wise policy, as a matter of harmonious
interstate relations, for states to accord
each other immunity or to respect any established limits on liability. They are free
to do so." Id. 99 S.Ct at 1191. Thus, it is
within the the sound discretion of a state to
decide whether to extend sovereign immunity in a particular case.
Exercising this discretion, several state
and federal courts have acknowledged a
sister state's sovereign immunity under the
principle of comity. See, e.g., Lee v. Miller
County, Arkansas, 800 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir.
1986) (court upheld a Texas court's choice
to grant an Arkansas county immunity
from suit as a matter of comity in an action
involving a helicopter crash which injured a
Texas resident); Ramsden v. Illinois, 695
S.W.2d 457 (Mo.1985) (Missouri court declined to assert jurisdiction in an action
brought against an Illinois state mental
health center by Missouri residents alleging breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation); Simmons v. Montana,

206 Mont. 264, 670 P.2d 1372 (1983) (Montana court declined to assert jurisdiction
against the state of Oregon in a medical
malpractice action); Paulus v. South Dakota, 52 N.D. 84, 201 N.W. 867 (1924)
(North Dakota court refused to assume
jurisdiction where a South Dakota resident
was injured while working in a North Dakota coal mine); Newberry v. Georgia
Deft of Indus, and Trade, 286 S.C. 574,
336 S.E.2d 464 (1985) (South Carolina court
decided to respect Georgia's sovereign immunity and held that Georgia could not be
sued in tort in South Carolina).1
[3] Courts have focused on a variety of
public policy concerns in determining
whether to extend comity in a particular
case. Of primary importance is whether
the public policies of the forum state would
be contravened if comity were extended.
Head v. Platte County, Missouri, 242 Kan.
442, 749 P.2d 6, 10 (1988); Robertson v.
Estate ofMcKnight, 591 S.W.2d 639, 642
(Tex.Civ.App. 1979).
[4] Other reasons articulated by courts
for extending comity include: to give primary regard to the rights of their own
citizens;2 to foster cooperation, promote
harmony and build goodwill with sister
states; 3 to have claims against a state litigated by that state's own courts;4 and to
prevent forum shopping and avoid practical
problems involved in enforcing a judgment
by one state against another.5
Applying the foregoing principles, we
find the trial court—far from abusing its
discretion by declining to assert jurisdiction
over L.A. Water under the doctrine of comity—ruled in a manner which was fair, just,
and abundantly sensible. There are three
independent grounds supporting our conclusion.

1. But see Mianecki v. Second Judicial Dist. 2. See, e.g., Head, 749 P.2d at 10; Robertson, 591
S.W.2d at 642.
Court, 99 Nev. 93, 658 P.2d 422, 425 (1983), and
Ehrlich-Bober 6t Co. v. University of Houston, 49
N.Y.2d 574, 427 N.Y.S.2d 604, 404 N.E.2d 726 3. Lee, 800 F.2d at 1378.
(1980), both of which affirmed the trial court's
discretionary decision not to apply a sister 4. Ramsden, 695 S.W.2d at 460.
state's sovereign immunity law as a matter of
comity.
5. Newberry, 336 S.E.2d at 465.
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First, both California and Utah have similar immunity statutes, each with a twoyear limitations period. Cf. Utah Code
Ann. §§ 63-30-13, -15 (1986). Thus, the
court was applying a statute of limitations
consonant with Utah public policy; such a
statute would be applied to Utah governmental entities sued in Utah as well as
California entities sued in California. As
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently
stated under similar circumstances:
Both states have a policy in favor of
some form of immunity in a situation
such as this. We do not believe that the
fortuity of an Arkansas county being
involved in a helicopter crash in Texas is
an appropriate occasion to circumscribe
the clear intent of lawmakers in both
Texas and Arkansas.
Lee, 800 F.2d at 1379.
Second, Utah has little interest in litigating this dispute. Mr. Jackett is a California resident and L.A. Water is a California
governmental entity. The fortuitous occurrence of the crash in Utah is not a compelling reason to accept jurisdiction. Mr.
Jackett's actions in this case parallel the
actions of the plaintiff in Paulus v. South
Dakota, 52 N.D. 84, 201 N.W. 867 (1924),
where the North Dakota court refused to
assume jurisdiction on comity grounds, and
required the plaintiff to seek relief in the
courts of his own state. Id. 201 N.W. at
870.
Finally, extending comity in this case
prevents forum shopping. Soon after Mr.
Jackett was injured he filed a timely notice
of claim as required by California's Governmental Claims Act. It was only after Mr.
Jackett missed California's two-year statute of limitations, and thus, was foreclosed
from suing in California that hefiledhis
claim in Utah. Allowing Mr. Jackett to
pursue his claim in our courts would open
the door to other tardy out-of-state plaintiffs searching for a more favorable forum.
See Newberry, 336 S.E.2d at 465.
Based upon the foregoing, we find the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in
applying the doctrine of comity to foreclose

Mr. Jackett's suit. Accordingly, the trial
court's decision is affirmed.
JACKSON and ORME, JJ., concur.
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Louis E. WILSON, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 880103-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 29, 1989.
Defendant was convicted of sexual
abuse of a child. Judgment was entered in
the Second District Court, Weber County,
John F. Wahlquist, J., and defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, J.,
held that (1) trial judge committed harmless error by permitting wife of defendant
to testify against him; (2) trial court's refusal to excuse prospective juror for cause
was not error, and (3) prosecution could
amend information to specify different date
of offense.
Affirmed.
1. Witnesses «=»36
State constitutional provision granting
witness absolute privilege not to be "compelled" to testify against his or her spouse
does not give witness spouse a right to
testify, and thus does not render unconstitutional statute granting the testimonial
privilege to defendant spouse. Const Art
1, § 12; U.C.A.1953, 78-24-8(1).
2. Criminal Law *»1170VW1)
Error in permitting wife to testify
against husband in sexual abuse of child
case was harmless, where evidence of wife
was cumulative to clear and consistent tes-

ADDENDUM # 4

PLACE OF TRIAL - VENUE
cause claimed title to property located in
county other than one in which suit brought did
not divest court of junsdiction, nor of right to
try and determine title to property in such
county Barber v Anderson, 73 Utah 357. 274 P
136 (1929).
Action to foreclose mortgage is properly
brought m county where the land is situated
upon which the foreclosure is sought. First
Natl Bank v. Boley, 90 Utah 341, 61 P2d 621
(1936); Boley v District Court ex rel. Morgan

78-13-3

County, 90 Utah 347. 61 P2d 624 (1936).
Action for rescission of contract for sale of
real property on grounds of fraud or mistake is
n o t one in which gravamen of action is determination of right or interest in real property;
hence court did not err in refusing change of
venue to county in which real property was
located Calder v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 2
U t a h 2 d 309, 273 P2d 168, 46 A.L.R.2d 887
(1954).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 77 Am. Jur. 2d Venue § 10 et „ A.L.R — Venue of damage action for breach
seq.
of real estate sales contract, 8 A.L.R.3d 489.
C.J.S. - 92 C.J.S. Venue § 26 et seq.
Key Numbers. - Venue <*=> 5.1 to 5.3.

78-13-2. Actions to recover fines or penalties — Against
public officers.
Actions for the following causes shall be tried in the county where the cause,
or some part thereof, arose, subject to the like power of the court to change the
place of trial:
(1) For the recovery of a fine, penalty or forfeiture imposed by statute,
except that, when it is imposed for an offense committed on a lake, river or
other stream of water situated in two or more counties, the action may be
brought in any county, bordering on such lake, river or stream opposite to
the place where the offense was committed.
(2) Except as otherwise specifically provided, against a public officer, or
person especially appointed to execute his duties, for an act done by him
in virtue of his office, or against a person who by his command or in his aid
does anything touching the duties of such officer.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, 5 1» C. 1943,
Supp., 104-13-2.
Cross-References. — Governmental Immunity Act, § 63-30-1 et seq.

Limitation of actions against public officers,
§ 78-12-24.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Constitutionality.

Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 5. Snyder v. Pike, 30

Predecessor section did not violate former

Utah 102, 83 P. 692 (1905;.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 63A Am. Jur 2d Public
Officers and Employees § 527; 77 Am. Jur. 2d
Venue § 24.

C.J.S. - 92 C J S Venue § 51 et seq.
Key Numbers. - Venue o 9, 11

78-13-3. Actions against a county.
An action against a county may be commenced and tried in such county,
unless such action is brought by a county, in which case it may be commenced
and tried in any county not a party thereto.
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78-13-4
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History: L. 1951, ch. 58, 5 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-13-3.
Cross-References. — Governmental Immunity Act, § 63-30-1 et seq.

Limitation of action against county, § 78-1230.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Constitutionality.
Predecessor section did not violate former

Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 5. Snyder v. Pike, 30
Utah 102, 83 P. 692 (1905).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal
Corporations, Counties and Other Political
Subdivisions §§ 855 to 857.

C.J.S. - 20 C.J.S. Counties § 326.
Key Numbers. — Counties ^» 215.

78-13-4. Actions on written contracts.
When the defendant has signed a contract in the state to perform an
obligation, an action on the contract may be commenced and tried in the
following venues:
(1) If the action is to enforce an interest in real property securing a
consumer's obligation, the action may be brought only in the county where
the real property is located or where the defendant resides.
(2) An action to enforce an interest other than under Subsection (1) may
be brought in the county where such obligation is to be performed, the
contract was signed, or in which the defendant resides.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, 5 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-13-4; 1990, ch. 194, 8 1.
Cross-References. — Oral contracts, limitation of action, § 78-12-25.

Written contracts, limitation of action, § 7812-23.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Constitutionality.
Place of performance.
Plaintiffs option.
Specific actions.
Transfer of cause to proper county.
C
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Predecessor section did not violate former
Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 5. Snyder v. Pike, 30
Utah 102, 83 P. 692 (1905). But see Brown v.
Bach, 17 Utah 435, 53 P. 991 (1898).

implication of those terms. Palfreyman v.
TVueman, 105 Utah 463, 142 P.2d 677 (1943).
Plaintiff's option.
Party bringing the action has the option to
choose the county of contracted performance, or
the county of residence of defendant, if he
resides in a different county from that of agreed
performance, in which to lodge his venue. Floor
v
M
h u Q6 U t a h 2Q
p2d ^
{1935)
m_
IACTT*. U >«CO l i o o o j
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lo7 r.Zd H ily4o).

Place of performance.
Mere reference to residence or place of business in writing, having no reference to place of
performance, is not sufficient to bring writing
within this section. Floor v. Mitchell, 86 Utah
203, 41 R2d 281 (1935).
For the purpose of venue, the place where the
defendant is to perform the obligation must be
determinable from either the express terms of
the written agreement or from the necessary

Where contract performance was due in Salt
Lake County and defendants resided in Cache
County, plaintiff had the option of suing defendants on the contract in either Salt Lake or
Cache County; trial court did not have prerogative to grant defendant's motion for change of
venue to Cache County where plaintiff had
chosen to sue in Salt Lake County. Walker
Bank & Trust Co. v. Walker, 631 P.2d 860 (Utah
1981).
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ADDENDUM # 5

§ 5

CONFLICT OF LAWS

Ch. 1

Conflict of Laws than in most other areas of the law, and it
seems probable that this trend will continue. As experience
accumulates, some existing Conflict of Laws rules may be modified and additional rules may be devised in order to cover narrower situations with greater precision and definiteness. The
extent to which there have been changes in Conflict of Laws
rules since the appearance of the original Restatement of this
Subject is indicated in the various Sections and in the Reporter's
Notes.
d. Underlying policies. The policies reflected, by Conflict
of Laws rules are essentially of two kinds: those which underlie
the particular local law rules at issue and those which underlie
multistate situations in general. An important objective in
any choice-of-law case is to accommodate in the best way possible the policities underlying the potentially applicable local
law rules of the states involved. Since multistate situations
give rise to peculiar policies of their own, Conflict of Laws rules
should reflect these policies.
Important factors underlying rules of choice of law are
discussed in § 6.
§ 6.

Choice-of-Law Principles

(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will
follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of
law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international
systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states
and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular
field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of
the law to be applied.
&•• Appendix for Court Citation and Crogi R«f«rono«s
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ADDENDUM # 6

Ch. 8

CONTRACTS

Comment h: The cases generally support the view that it is the
local law of the state chosen by
the parties that should be applied,
Two exceptional cases to the contary are Duskin v. PennsylvaniaCentral Airlines Corp., supra, and
Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus
Shipping Co., Ltd., supra.

§ 188.

§ 188

Comment i: For a case suggesting that the parties may
choose a special law to govern the
validity of an arbitration clause
contained in an agreement, see
Matter of Electronic & Missile
Facilities, Inc., N.Y.L.J. 12/26/62,
p. 10, col. 5.

Law Governing in Absence of Effective Choice by
the Parties

(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to
an issue in contract are determined by the local law of
the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most
significant relationship to the transaction and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the
parties (see § 187), the contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the
law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their
relative importance with respect to the particular issue.
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the
place of performance are in the same state, the local
law of this state will usually be applied, except as otherwise provided in §§ 189-199 and 203.
Comment:
a. Scope of section. The rule of this Section applies in all
situations where there has not been an effective choice of the
applicable law by the parties (see § 187).
See Appendix for Court Citation and Cross References
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ADDENDUM #7

§ 190

CONFLICT OF LAWS

110-117(1950); Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 342-353 (3d ed.
§ 191.

Ch. 8

1963); Note, 38 Tulane L.Rev.
726, 732 C1964).

Contracts to Sell Interests in Chattel

The validity of a contract for the sale of an interest
in a chattel and the rights created thereby are determined, in the absence of an effective choice of law by
the parties, by the local law of the state where under
the terms of the contract the seller is to deliver the
chattel unless, with respect to the particular issue, some
other state has a more significant relationship under the
principles stated in § 6 .to the transaction and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will
be applied.
Comment:
a. Distinction between contract and transfer. A distinction must here be drawn between a contract for the sale of an
interest in a chattel and the actual transfer of such an interest.
The validity of a contract to sell an interest in a chattel, and
the rights created thereby, are determined by the local law of
the state selected by application of the rule of this Section. On
the other hand, whether the contract operates as an actual
transfer of an interest in the chattel depends upon the law selected by application of the rules of §§ 244-245. A contract to
sell an interest in a chattel may be valid as a contract but inoperative as a transfer, or, in the alternative, it may be invalid
as a contract but operative as a transfer.
6. Scope of section. The law selected by application of
the present rule determines such questions as whether the contract is void or voidable because of the illegality of the consideration, whether the contract can be rescinded because of the
buyer's insolvency or of the seller's failure to comply with certain of the contract's provisions, whether the seller's nondelivery is excused by the buyer's failure to procure a proper
letter of credit, whether the loss of goods in transit is at the
risk of the seller or buyer, whether an option to buy has been
effectively exercised by the buyer, whether the buyer can recover the profits he would have made if the seller had performed the contract, whether there has been a breach of warranty, express or implied, by the seller, and whether acceptance
of the goods by the buyer is a bar to an action by him for breach
of warranty.
See Appendix for Court Citation and Crotf References
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ADDENDUM #8

Ch. 8

CONTRACTS

§ 196

R E P O R T E R ' S NOTE
The great majority of the cases aff'd sub nom. Zimmerman v.
in this area involve the issue of
Sutherland, 274 U S . 253 (1927).
usury, as to which see § 203.
The Uniform Commercial Code
Where usury was not in issue, provides in § 4-102 that the liathe few cases in point have ap- bility of a bank "for action or
plied the local law of the place of non-action with respect to any
repayment in situations where the item handled by it for purpose of
contract required that payment be presentment, payment or collecmade in a single state. See e. g., tion is governed by the law of the
Crews v. Mutual Ben. Life Insur- place where the bank is located."
ance Co., 104 Ind.App. 183, 8 N.E. The reference, presumably, is to
2d 390 (1937). In most of these the local law of the bank's locacases the plaoe of repayment coin- tion, since in other sections, where
cided with that in which the con- a reference to the whole law is intract was made. In one case the tended, the authors of the Code
local law of the place of repay- expressly state this fact. Cf. §§
ment was applied even though the 1-105 and 9-103.
contract had been made in another
See generally, Batiffol, Les
state. Gregg v. Fitzpatrick, 54 Conflits de Lois en Matiere de
Ga.App. 303, 187 S.E. 730 (1936). Contrats 198-207 (1938) and 3
Comment e: See Zimmerman v.
Hicks, 7 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1925),

§

196.

Rabel, Conflict of Laws 7, 16
(1950).

Contracts for the Rendition of Services

The validity of a contract for the rendition of services
and the rights created thereby are determined, in the
absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, by
the local law of the state where the contract requires
that the services, or a major portion of the services, be
rendered, unless, with respect to the particular issue,
some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the transaction and
the parties, in which the event the local law of the
other state will be applied.
Comment:
a. Scope of section.
The rule of this Section applies to
contracts for the rendition of services whether these are to be
rendered by the contracting party himself or by others in his
behalf. The rule applies to contracts with servants, independent
contractors and agents and with persons exercising a public profession, as lawyers, doctors, brokers, commission agents and factors.
Se« Appendix for Court Citation and Crois R«f«r«nc«i
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